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• Purpose: This study examines whether and how the power of a chief executive officer (CEO) 
relates to firm-level research and development (R&D) investment. 
• Design/methodology/approach: The authors employ clustered standard errors OLS 
regression using a large sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2017. 
• Findings: The authors find a significant negative relation between CEO power and R&D 
investment, suggesting that firms with more powerful CEOs are less likely to invest in R&D 
activities. Besides, we find that this significant negative relation is largely driven by firms with 
weaker corporate governance. 
• Originality: This study contributes to the finance literature on the impact and consequences of 



















CEO Power and R&D Investment 
1. Introduction 
In today’s competitive and dynamic business environment, it is critical for firms to 
produce a steady stream of innovations (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). Many prior studies 
including Balkin et al. (2000) point out that the primary source of innovation is research and 
development investment (R&D investment). R&D investment includes all tangible and 
intangible resources (e.g., financial resources, technological resources, and necessary personnel) 
devoted to a firm’s innovation activities. R&D investment is critical because it is a key driver for 
a firm to maintain its competitive advantage (O’Brien, 2003). According to a study conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), "R&D spending among the Global Innovation 1000 overall 
increased 11.4 percent in 2018, to a record high of $782 billion, reflecting R&D spending 
increases in all regions and nearly all industries".1  However, such investment is also very risky 
because R&D projects place substantial demand for firm resources, resulting in an adverse 
impact on current performance.2 More importantly, the payoffs of R&D projects are uncertain 
and unpredictable with a likelihood of failure. 
The CEO is the central decision-maker and has the greatest power to make critical 
investment and resource allocation decisions (Barker and Mueller, 2002) such as investment in 
R&D activities.  Prior literature unveils the incentives of CEOs on R&D spending (e.g., Balkin et 
al., 2000; Cheng, 2004; Cheng et al., 2016); however, the effect of powerful CEOs on R&D 
investment is still unexplored. The consequences of CEO power are extensively examined in the 
literature, but the results are inconclusive. Adams et al. (2005) argue that the powerful CEO’s 
decision-making ability leads to either good or bad consequences. While some research suggests 
that CEO power increases firm performance and outcomes (e.g., Daily and Johnson, 1997; 
Keltner et al., 2003), others argue that powerful CEOs lead to negative outcomes such as poor 
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firm performance and value (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2011), low bond ratings (e.g., Liu and Jiraporn, 
2010), and an increase in agency conflicts (e.g., Dunn, 2004). Despite the increased attention on 
the consequences of having powerful CEOs, there is limited empirical evidence on whether and 
how powerful CEOs influence a firm’s innovation activities. 
The purpose of our study is to examine the impact of CEO power on R&D investment. 
On one hand, we posit a positive relation between CEO power and R&D investment because 
powerful CEOs are high ability CEOs (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Keltner et al., 2003) and such 
managers are more likely to invest in R&D activities (Kor 2006; Kroll et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, based on the agency theory, we predict a negative relation between CEO power and R&D 
investment. Prior research suggests that more powerful CEOs reflect a higher level of agency 
conflicts, which causes such CEOs to invest less in R&D activities.  Using a large panel sample 
with more than 28, 000 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2017, we document a significant 
negative relation between CEO power and R&D investment. This evidence suggests that firms 
with more powerful CEOs are less likely to devote resources to R&D activities, consistent with 
the agency theory. We perform a battery of additional tests and still obtain consistent results, 
suggesting that our primary results are robust. In addition, we find that this relation is mainly 
driven by firms with weaker corporate governance.   
This study makes several noticeable academic and practical contributions. First, the study 
contributes to the stream of accounting literature that examines the determinants of R&D 
investments. For example, Fedyk and Khimich (2018) show that firms overinvest in R&D if they 
are at the growth stage, unprofitable, or belong to science-driven industries, while firms 
underinvest in R&D to avoid losses. Our findings add to this literature by investigating a 
different reason for underinvestment in R&D activities, which is determined by CEO power. 
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Moreover, this study extends the literature on characteristics and incentives of CEOs to 
over/under-invest in R&D.  For example, prior literature shows that R&D investment is 
determined by CEO tenure (Chen, 2013; Dechow and Sloan, 1991), short-term compensation 
(Balkin et al., 2000; Cheng, 2004), stock option (Wu and Tu, 2007), and real earnings 
management (Cheng et al., 2016). Our results also extend the findings of Barker and Mueller 
(2002) that R&D investment can be largely explained by CEO personal characteristics. We show 
a new characteristic of CEOs, CEO power, which may affect R&D investment. Third, the study 
contributes to the corporate governance literature; in particular, to the agency problem in the 
presence of weak governance. We further support the findings of Cheng (2008) by using 
different proxies for governance and CEO power; we use a more comprehensive measure of 
corporate governance effectiveness, the entrenchment index developed by Bebchuck et al. 
(2009). Fourth, from the public interests' perspective, our study joins the public debate on 
whether having powerful CEOs is beneficial to an organization. Prior research suggests that it is 
rather difficult to predict the consequences of powerful CEOs (Larcker and Tayan, 2012). Hence, 
our study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the consequences of CEO 
power. Our findings show that powerful CEOs tend to undervalue the long-term benefits of R&D 
investment. Lastly, this study has practical implications. For example, investors that focus on the 
long-term success of a firm may invest in firms with less powerful CEOs because such firms are 
less likely to invest in R&D investment.  
The remainder of our study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design and Section 4 reports 




2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Prior research on R&D activities can be classified into two categories. The first category 
investigates whether R&D expenditures can bring future benefits. For example, Curtis et al. 
(2020) find that R&D expenditures are positively related to future firm profitability and this 
relation becomes weaker over time. The second category examines the factors that may influence 
a firm’s R&D activities. In this category, prior research examines the impact of stock ownership 
on R&D investment (e.g., Graves, 1988; Baysinge et al., 1991; Hansen and Hill, 1991; Chen and 
Huang, 2006; Deutsch, 2007; Chen and Hsu, 2009). For instance, Chen and Huang (2006) find a 
significant positive relation between employee stock ownership and R&D expenditures, 
suggesting that employee stock ownership can help mitigate agency problems. On the contrary, 
Chen and Hsu (2009) reveal a negative relation between family ownership and R&D investment, 
suggesting that family-owned companies may undervalue the importance of long-term R&D 
activities. Kim and Lu (2011) show that CEO ownership can influence R&D spending when 
external governance is weak. Some studies (e.g., Scherer, 1984) find that R&D investment is 
industry-specific, showing that some industries such as high-tech industries naturally have high 
R&D spending. Studies including Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) and Baysingner and Hoskisson 
(1989) find that the level of R&D activities varies with a firm’s business strategies, highlighting 
the dynamic nature of R&D investment.  
Top managers play a crucial role in setting the firm’s strategic plan, R&D agenda, and 
capital investment (Chan et al., 2020). More specifically, the CEO is the central decision-maker 
and has the greatest power to make critical investment and resource allocation decisions (Barker 
and Mueller, 2002). Prior research explores the impact of CEO incentives on R&D spending 
from different theoretical perspectives. According to the Upper-Echelons Theory (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984), the actions of CEOs are based on their understanding of the strategic situations 
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they confront. This understanding is significantly shaped by their tenure (Souder et al., 2012), 
which mirrors their paradigms, skills, knowledge, and cognition orientation (Barker and Mueller, 
2002; Richard et al., 2009). Chen (2013) extends this finding by uncovering an inverted-U 
relation between CEO tenure and R&D spending and documenting the existence of the horizon 
problem (i.e., earnings-based performance measures provide executives with incentives to focus 
on short-term performance), consistent with Dechow and Sloan (1991) that find CEOs spend less 
on R&D during their last years in office. Cheng (2004) also documents that changes in R&D 
spending are positively related to changes in CEO compensation in the presence of the horizon 
and myopia problems. Using a small sample of high-tech firms, Balkin et al. (2000) find that 
CEO’s short-term compensation (i.e., salary) is positively related to a firm’s innovation, which 
suggests that CEOs with higher short-term compensation tend to invest more in R&D 
investment. However, the relation between the CEO’s long-term compensation and R&D 
investment is insignificant. Manso (2011) proposes theoretically that incentive contracts should 
ensure a long-term commitment to motivate managers to explore new ideas, rather than exploit 
the existing ones. Using only four R&D intensive industries, Wu and Tu (2007) find that CEOs’ 
stock option is more positively related to R&D spending when slack resources or firm 
performance are high.  
In a similar vein, other studies examine the impact of CEO personal characteristics on 
R&D spending. For example, Barker and Mueller (2002) investigate the impact of several CEO 
personal characteristics including education, advanced science-related degree, age, and career 
experience in certain areas on R&D investment. The authors find that advanced science-related 
degrees, age, and significant experience in marketing or engineering are related to R&D 
investment, suggesting that a firm’s R&D activities can be largely explained by CEO 
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characteristics. Serfling (2014) uncovers a negative relation between CEO age and R&D 
spending.  
Despite the vast body of literature on the link between CEO characteristics and R&D 
activities, yet little research examines the impact of CEO power (an important CEO 
characteristic) on R&D investment. Prior research on CEO power has focused on the 
consequences of powerful CEOs, as the advantages and disadvantages of having powerful CEOs 
are widely discussed in the literature with inconclusive findings. Adams et al. (2005) find that 
firm performance rises and falls depending on the power of the CEO. A powerful CEO is 
considered a valuable asset to the firm and its stakeholders if this CEO is able to make correct 
corporate decisions leading to superior firm performance. On the contrary, the firm might face 
incredible damages if a powerful CEO makes wrong or bad decisions.  
On the one hand, empirical studies suggest a positive relation between CEO power and 
firm performance and outcomes. Daily and Johnson (1997) find that CEO power and firm 
performance are highly correlated. Specifically, they suggest that firm operating performance is 
both an antecedent condition and outcome of CEO power. Moreover, Breit et al. (2019) find that 
CEO power increases employee productivity. This leads to the conclusion that powerful CEOs 
can implement their decisions more efficiently. As a result, the positive relation between CEO 
power and firm performance suggests that powerful CEOs are high ability CEOs or more capable 
CEOs. If this is the case, we expect a positive relation between CEO power and R&D investment 
because prior research suggests that more capable managers better understand R&D spending 
and the benefits of such spending (e.g., Kor 2006; Kroll et al., 2008). Specifically, Kroll et al. 
(2008) state that capable managers are better able to understand the short-term and long-term 
implications of R&D investment, to implement R&D strategies, and to identify projects with 
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positive net present value. If more powerful CEOs lead to stronger firm performance, we 
intuitively expect that such CEOs are better able to allocate more resources to their R&D 
activities due to abundant resources (e.g., financial resources) generated by stronger 
performance. Thus, based on the above arguments, we posit a positive relation between CEO 
power and R&D spending by proposing the following hypothesis:  
H1: CEO power is positively related to R&D investment.  
On the other hand, other studies imply that CEO power may lead to several negative 
outcomes. Dunn (2004) argues that an increased concentration of power increases agency 
conflicts, motivating CEOs to take self-serving actions and engage in illegal corporate behaviors. 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) document that firms with more powerful CEOs demonstrate inferior 
operating performance and lower market valuation. Studies also document a significant negative 
relation between CEO power and capital structure (Jiraporn et al., 2012), and bond ratings (Liu 
and Jiraporn, 2010). In risky or volatile environments, Han et al. (2016) find that powerful CEOs 
perform worse than their counterparts. Moreover, Dikolliet et al. (2018) find that powerful CEOs 
are less likely to use relative performance evaluation, suggesting that powerful CEOs have more 
incentives to avoid risks and to engage in opportunistic behavior. These studies suggest that 
powerful CEOs are more likely to engage in opportunistic corporate behavior, inconsistent with 
the objectives of shareholders. Thus, CEO power is highly correlated with agency conflicts. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problems arise when agents pursue personal 
objectives, which can be explained by the difference in risk preferences between principals and 
agents. Agency theory predicts that principals are often risk-neutral because they can invest in 
different companies to mitigate risks. Agents are often risk-averse because their compensation 
and career are solely dependent on their company. Thereby, when agency problems arise, agents 
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are less likely to undertake risky projects such as R&D investment. If the operating performance 
of firms with more powerful CEOs becomes worse, we predict that such firms may not be able to 
devote resources to R&D spending due to poor performance. Taken together, we posit that more 
powerful CEOs are less likely to invest in R&D activities, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H2: CEO power is negatively related to R&D investment.  
3. Research Design 
3.1 Measuring CEO Power 
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) to measure the CEO power in our study. Bebchuk et al. 
(2011) introduce an objective measure of CEO power, known as the CEO Pay Slice (CPS). CPS 
is the fraction of the CEO’s total compensation to the sum of the compensation of the top five 
executives (including the CEO). Total compensation is obtained from the ExecuComp database, 
which usually includes salary, bonus, other pay, long-term incentive payouts, restricted stocks, 
stock option, and other benefits. Bebchuk et al. (2011) argue that the CPS is an accurate and 
objective proxy for CEO power because this ratio captures the relative significance of the CEO 
in the organizational hierarchy. Particularly, they emphasize (at least) three advantages of using 
the CPS as a proxy for CEO power: (1) it captures numerous observable and unobservable 
factors in the dynamics of top executives in an organization, (2) it captures firm-level 
characteristics well since this measure is based on the ratio of the CEO pay to the other 
executives in the same firm, and (3) it contains significant information value as CPS is strongly 
related to important firm performance indicators such as profitability and market value. The 
higher the CPS, the more powerful the CEO.  
3.2 Empirical Specification 




R&D Investment = ɑ0 + ɑ1CEOPOWER+ ɑ2AGE + ɑ3TENURE + ɑ4COMP + ɑ5Real_EM 
+ ɑ6lnTA + ɑ7AD + ɑ8LEV + ɑ9ROA + ɑ10SaleGrowth + ɑ11MTB + ɑ12OpCash + 
ɑ13Loss + ɑ14BIG4 + ɑ15SGA + ɑ16Cash + ɑ17FinCash + ɑ18CapX + ɑ19PPE + Industry 
Indicators + Year Indicators + ɛ                                     [Equation 1] 
In Equation 1, we use CEO Pay Slices (CPS) to measure CEOPOWER. The dependent variable, 
R&D Investment, alternatively represents the following two measures, RD and RDEmpl. RD is 
the total research and development expenses (XRD) scaled by total firm assets (AT). RdEmpl is 
the total research and development expenses (XRD) scaled by total employees (EMP). If our first 
hypothesis (H1) is valid, we expect the coefficient on CEOPOWER (ɑ1) to be significant and 
positive. That is, more powerful CEOs tend to invest more in their R&D activities. If our second 
hypothesis (H2) is valid, we expect the coefficient on CEOPOWER (ɑ1) to be significant and 
negative, which implies that firms with more powerful CEOs have lower R&D investment.   
 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Cheng, 2004; Kim and Lu, 2011; Serfling, 2014), we 
first control for several CEO characteristics that are closely related to CEO power, namely CEO 
age (AGE), CEO tenure (TENURE), CEO compensation (COMP). We also include the level of 
real earnings management (Real_EM) because R&D spending can be manipulated in real 
earnings management (Cheng, 2004; Cheng et al., 2016). Next, we control for factors that may 
influence R&D activities, which are similar to those used in prior research (e.g., Biddle et al., 
2009; Canace et al., 2018; Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Jia, 2019; Perry and Grinaker, 1994; 
Ramalingegowda et al., 2013). Specifically, we control for firm size (measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets), leverage (measured by the total debt to total assets ratio), and 
profitability (measured by the return-on-assets ratio). For example, larger firms may be more 
likely to invest in R&D activities and profit from them, more profitable firms may also be 
increasingly motivated to commercialize from R&D activities. Management’s risk tolerance 
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influences the firm’s likelihood of investing in innovation, we proxy to risk tolerance by 
leverage. Sales growth and market to book ratio control for growth because growth opportunities 
of a firm can affect its level of innovativeness. Moreover, liquidity is an important determinant 
of R&D investment; we control for cash from operations, cash and short-term investments, and 
cash from financing activities, and control for additional expenses that might affect the liquidity 
such as advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses. We also control 
for asset tangibility (measured by net property, plants, and equipment) and capital expenditures, 
because these expenditures represent investment decisions that compete for the same resources 
as R&D. Finally, we control for whether a firm uses a Big4 auditor and whether a firm reports 
loss in a given year.  
In testing our hypotheses, we use clustered standard errors OLS regression because our 
sample is a panel sample. All continuous variables in Equation 1 are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% percentiles to curtail the influences of any outliers. Industry indicators (based on Fama and 
French 48 industry classification) and year indicators are also included in the baseline regression 
model. Please refer to Appendix 1 for detailed variable definitions.  
3.3 Sample Distribution and Descriptive statistics 
Our sample is an intersection of data from the ExecuComp database for CEO 
compensation information and the Compustat database for financial statement information. Our 
final sample consists of 28,825 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2017. Table 1 reports the 
full sample descriptive statistics. The mean values of RD and RDEmpl are 0.030 and 15.528, 
respectively. The mean value of CPS is 0.397. The average CEO age is about 56. The mean 
values of MTB, LEV, and ROA are 3.380, 0.196, and 0.040, respectively, suggesting that our 
sample firms demonstrate normal operating performance. The mean value of BIG4 is 0.936, 
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showing that the majority of our sample firms use one of the Big 4 accounting firms as their 
auditor.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The correlation coefficient (untabulated) between CPS and RD is -0.044 with a p-value of 
less than 0.0001, suggesting a significant negative correlation between CEO power and R&D 
investment. This evidence indicates that firms with more powerful CEOs are less likely to invest 
in their R&D activities, lending initial support to our second hypothesis (H2). However, the 
correlation between CPS and RDEmpl is insignificant. Most correlation coefficients are fairly 
small, which may suggest that multicollinearity should not be a major concern in our study.  
4. Primary Findings 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate our baseline regression model and report results in 
Table 2. Column 1 (Column 2) shows that the coefficient on CPS is -0.023 (-16.949) with a t-
value of -12.06 (-9.43) where the dependent variable is RD (RDEmpl). The findings indicate a 
significant negative relation between CPS and R&D investment, suggesting that firms with 
powerful CEOs are less likely to invest in R&D activities. Hence, H2 is strongly supported.  
Both columns present that R&D investment is positively related to MTB, Cash, CapX, 
and Big4, and negatively related to Ad, LEV, ROA, SGA, FinCash, OpCash, and PPE. For the 
most part, the above relations are in line with general expectations. For example, the significant 
positive relation between R&D investment and Cash suggests that firms with more cash tend to 
invest more in their R&D activities.  
Our primary findings are economically meaningful. Column 1 reports an adjusted R2 of 
0.6307, which suggests that the model (where the dependent variable is RD) explains 
approximately 63 percent of the variation. As shown in Column 2, the specification (where 
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RDEmpl is the dependent variable) explains approximately 48 percent of the variation. Based on 
Column 1, a standard deviation increase in CPS is associated with an approximately 9 % 
decrease in RD. Based on Column 2, a standard deviation increase in CPS is associated with an 
approximately 13 % decrease in RDEmpl. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
5. Additional Tests 
5.1 Alternative Innovation Measures 
Prior research (e.g., Gao et al., 2016) uses the number of patents as a measure of 
innovation, by arguing that patents reflect the outcomes and the success rates of innovation 
activities. In other words, the measure of patents complements the measure of R&D investment 
in the context of innovation activities. Hence, using patents (PAT) as the dependent variable, we 
re-estimate Equation 1 and report results in Table 3. PAT is the natural logarithm of the total 
number of patents + 1. Table 3 shows that the coefficient on CPS is -0.151 with a t-value of -
1.88, suggesting a significant negative relation between CEO power and patenting activities. 
Hence, our primary findings are robust to this alternative innovation measure.   
[insert Table 3 about here] 
In a similar vein, we use another measure, namely innovation efficiency, which is 
calculated as the ratio of total patents to total R&D investment (e.g., Gao et al., 2016). We re-
estimate our baseline model using innovation efficiency as the dependent variable and report 
results in Table 4. The coefficient on CPS is -0.001 with a t-value of -1.89, still supporting our 
primary findings.  
[insert Table 4 about here] 
5.2 Alternative CEO Power Measures 
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Prior studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Combs et al., 2007) use CEO duality to proxy for 
CEO power. CEO duality means that the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. When a CEO 
chairs the board, the CEO is considered more powerful. Therefore, we use CEO duality 
(CEO_DUALITY) as an alternative measure of CEO power in our study. Additionally, we use 
an indicator variable (H_CPS) as another alternative measure. H_CPS takes a value of one if an 
observation’s CPS is greater than the median and zero otherwise. Using CEODULITY and 
H_CPS, we re-estimate Equation 1 and report results in Table 5.   
As shown in Table 5, the coefficient on CEO_DUALITY is -0.004 with a t-value of -7.42 
and -4.816 with a t-value of -9.62 where the dependent variables are RD and RDEmpl, 
respectively. Column 3 (Column 4) reports that the coefficient on H_CPS is -0.004 (-3.714) with 
a t-value of -7.47 (-6.39), where the dependent variable is RD (EDEmpl). The findings imply 
that the significant negative relation between CEO power and R&D investment is robust to 
alternative CEO power measures.  
[insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5.3 Changes analysis 
To curtail concerns about omitted correlated variables (e.g., Glaeser and Guay, 2017; 
Armstrong and Kepler, 2018), we perform a change analysis. Specifically, we conduct a 
regression analysis of regressing the changes in R&D (ΔRD and ΔRDEmpl) investment on the 
changes on CPS (ΔCPS) and other control variables. As shown in Table 6, the coefficient on 
ΔCPS is -0.008 with a t-value of -5.24 where the dependent variable is ΔRD in Column 1. 
However, the coefficient on CPS is insignificant using ΔRDEmpl as the dependent variable. 
Overall, the results of the change analysis provide some evidence to suggest that an increase (a 
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decrease) in CEO power can lead to a decrease (an increase) in R&D investment, lending 
additional support to our primary findings.  
[insert Table 6 about here] 
5.4 Two-stage OLS regression 
To mitigate concerns about endogeneity such as reverse causality (e.g., Glaeser and 
Guay, 2017; Armstrong and Kepler, 2018), we perform a two-stage OLS regression analysis 
(2SLS). Specifically, we use the industry-year median of CEO power (Ind_Year_Median_CPS) 
and the lag of CEO power (lagCPS) to predict an instrumental variable (Predicted _CPS) in the 
first stage. We next re-estimate our baseline model using the instrumental variable from the first 
stage of 2SLS. Column 1 of Table 7 shows the results of the first stage. The coefficients on 
Ind_Year_Median_CPS is 0.564 with a t-value of 9.25, and lagCPS is 0.353 with a t-value of 
73.28 suggest that our selection of IVs is appropriate. Columns 2 and 3 report the results of the 
second stage where the dependent variable is RD and RDEmpl, respectively. The coefficient on 
Predicted_CPS is -0.021 with a t-value of -4.31 in Column 2 and -16.861 with a t-value of -3.75 
in Column 3. Taken together, results of 2SLS support a significant negative relation between 
CEO power and R&D investment, consistent with our primary findings. We believe that such 
results may greatly curtail concerns about reverse causality in our study.  
[insert Table 7 about here] 
5.5. The Role of Corporate Governance 
Prior literature has shown that effective corporate governance reduces opportunistic 
behavior of managers and limit CEOs' power. For example, Cheng (2008) suggests that firms 
with larger boards have lower R&D spending. Accordingly, we anticipate that our primary 
findings are further confirmed for firms with weaker governance because firms with stronger 
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governance may have already restricted their CEO power. For this analysis, we use the 
entrenchment index (E-index) to proxy for corporate governance effectiveness (Bebchuk et al., 
2009). A low E-index suggests stronger corporate governance and vice versa. It is documented in 
prior research (e.g., Bebchuk et al.,2009) that this index is significantly related to lower firm 
valuation and negative abnormal returns.  
In this test, we insert a governance variable (EI) and an interaction term of CPS×EI into 
Equation 1 and report the results of estimating this modified model in Table 8. EI is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the value is less than the median E-index value and otherwise 0. 
Column 1 of Table 8 presents that the coefficient on CPS is -0.019 with a t-value of -6.18 where 
the dependent variable is RD. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.033 
with a t-value of -2.11. Similarly, Column 2 shows that the coefficient on CPS is -19.753 with a 
t-value of -5.52, and on CPS×EI is -31.216 with a t-value of -1.76. The significant negative 
coefficients on CPS×EI suggest that the impact of CEO power on R&D investment is stronger 
when the governance is weaker. In other words, our primary findings are more pronounced for 
firms with relatively weaker governance. Collectively, the results of Table 8 suggest that our 
primary evidence (a significant negative relation between CEO power and R&D investment) is 
largely driven by firms with weaker governance mechanisms, consistent with our prediction.   
[insert Table 8 about here] 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the impact of having more powerful CEOs on R&D spending. 
We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are less likely to invest in R&D activities. In 
addition, our primary findings are mainly driven by firms with weaker governance. Overall, our 
results suggest that having powerful CEOs may have a negative impact on corporate innovation 
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activities, which is consistent with agency theory and prior research documenting the negative 
consequences of having powerful CEOs.  
There exists a public ongoing debate on whether using powerful CEOs results in positive 
or negative outcomes. By using a negative link between CEO power and R&D investment, our 
study joins this public debate and contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of CEO 
power. Our results may interest investors that focus on the long-term success of a firm and 
different stakeholders that may have concerns about excessive CEO power.  
Like many other research studies, our study has several limitations. For example, our 
sample firms are large public firms in the United States because firms reporting the 
compensation data of their executives including the CEO to the ExecuComp database are large 
firms. Thereby, whether our primary findings hold for smaller, private, or international firms is 
still unknown. Next, although prior research has extensively used the CPS measure to proxy for 
CEO power, it is still an approximate measure. Additionally, other innovation measures may also 
exist because a firm’s innovation activities are broad in nature. Thereby, we believe that more 
precise measures of CEO power and other innovation measures may even lead to stronger 







Variable  Definition 
RD = Research and development expenditures (XRD), scaled by total assets (AT); 
RDEmpl = Research and development expenditures (XRD), scaled by total number of 
employees (EMP); 
CPS = CEO pay slice (CPS), measured as the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation 
to the total compensation of the top-five executives including the CEO; 
AGE = The age of the CEO; 
TENURE = The tenure of the CEO; 
COMP = Total compensation of the CEO (COMP) scaled by total assets (AT). 
Real_EM = Real earnings management, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and estimate 
abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (advertising, R&D, and SG&A). 
lnTA = Firm size, as the natural log of total assets (AT); 
Ad = Advertising intensity, as advertising expenses (XAD) scaled by total assets 
(AT); 
LEV = Leverage ratio, measure as the ratio of long-term liabilities (DLTT) to total 
assets (AT,); 
ROA = Return on assets, as income before extraordinary items (IB) scaled by total 
assets (AT); 
SaleGrowth = Change in Sale (SALE) divided by prior year's ending sale; 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio, as market value of common shares (CSHO) × (PRCC_F) 
divided by total book value of common shares (CEQ); 
OpCash = Cash flows from operating activities (OANCF) scaled by total assets (AT); 
Loss = An indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a loss otherwise zero; 
Big4 = An indicator variable that equals one if a firm uses a BIG 4 auditor and zero 
otherwise; 
SGA = Selling, general and administrative expense (XSGA) scaled by total assets 
(AT); 
Cash = Cash and short -term investments (CHE) scaled by total assets (AT); 
FinCash = Cash from Financing activities (FINCF) scaled by total assets (AT); 
CapX = Capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by total assets (AT); 
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CEO Power and R&D Investment 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
RD 28,825 0.030 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.036 
RDEmpl 28,825 15.528 43.249 0.000 0.000 10.748 
CPS 28,825 0.397 0.116 0.328 0.397 0.463 
AGE 28,825 55.779 6.977 51.000 56.000 60.000 
TENURE 28,825 7.233 7.086 2.000 5.000 10.000 
CEOGENDER 28,825 0.975 0.156 1.000 1.000 1.000 
COMP 28,825 3.313 4.721 0.777 1.824 3.876 
Real_EM 28,825 -0.035 0.227 -0.146 -0.003 0.085 
lnTA 28,825 14.396 1.593 13.242 14.298 15.463 
Ad 28,825 0.012 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.007 
LEV 28,825 0.196 0.160 0.039 0.187 0.305 
ROA 28,825 0.040 0.097 0.018 0.048 0.085 
SaleGrowth 28,825 0.102 0.245 -0.008 0.071 0.172 
MTB 28,825 3.380 3.895 1.517 2.301 3.729 
OpCash 28,825 0.099 0.083 0.059 0.096 0.142 
Loss 28,825 0.173 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Big4 28,825 0.936 0.244 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SGA 28,825 0.223 0.205 0.068 0.175 0.322 
Cash 28,825 0.143 0.165 0.023 0.078 0.206 
FinCash 28,825 -0.011 0.105 -0.061 -.0175 0.022 
CapX 28,825 0.055 0.052 0.021 0.039 0.070 






CEO Power and R&D Investment 
Primary Results 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 
 Dep. Var. = RD Dep. Var. = RDEmpl 
CPS -0.023*** -16.949*** 
 (-12.06) (-9.43) 
AGE -0.000*** -0.140*** 
 (-5.91) (-4.96) 
TENURE 0.002*** 1.358*** 
 (4.27) (3.37) 
COMP 0.002*** 1.087*** 
 (25.81) (19.12) 
Real_EM -0.108*** -67.076*** 
 (-74.37) (-49.90) 
lnTA -0.001*** 0.397** 
 (-4.97) (2.30) 
Ad -0.287*** -142.647*** 
 (-34.12) (-18.30) 
LEV -0.034*** -13.238*** 
 (-20.17) (-8.55) 
ROA -0.112*** -63.145*** 
 (-32.90) (-20.00) 
SaleGrowth -0.005*** 2.458*** 
 (-5.29) (2.79) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.796*** 
 (20.25) (14.42) 
OpCash -0.068*** -41.072*** 
 (-18.52) (-12.14) 
Loss -0.001 0.911 
 (-1.56) (1.35) 
Big4 0.007*** 5.766*** 
 (7.48) (7.12) 
SGA -0.037*** -64.648*** 
 (-19.10) (-36.23) 
Cash 0.083*** 81.179*** 
 (48.92) (51.53) 
FinCash -0.035*** -12.198*** 
 (-14.79) (-5.55) 
CapX 0.072*** 32.009*** 
 (11.74) (5.61) 
PPE -0.010*** -23.123*** 
 (-5.41) (-14.13) 
Constant 0.026*** 4.659 
 (5.87) (1.14) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 28,825 28,825 
Adjusted R2 0.6307 0.4773 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  





CEO Power and R&D Investment 
Alternative R&D Measure, Number of Patents 
 









































Industry Indicators Yes 
Year Indicators No 
Observations 19,584 
Adjusted R2 0.4262 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  




CEO Power and R&D Investment 
Alternative R&D Measure, Innovation Efficiency 
 











































Industry Indicators Yes 
Year Indicators No 
Observations 6,534 
Adjusted R2 0.0157 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  





CEO Power and R&D Investment 
Alternative CEO Power Measures 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
 Dep. Var. = RD Dep. Var. = RDEmpl Dep. Var. = RD Dep. Var. = RDEmpl 
CEO_DUALITY -0.004*** -4.816***   
 (-7.42) (-9.62)   
H_CPS   -0.004*** -3.714*** 
   (-7.47) (-6.39) 
AGE -0.000*** -0.064 -0.000*** -0.137*** 
 (-3.59) (-1.53) (-4.09) (-3.57) 
TENURE 0.002*** 1.980*** 0.002*** 1.391*** 
 (4.31) (4.74) (3.92) (3.61) 
COMP 0.001*** 0.937*** 0.001*** 1.000*** 
 (7.63) (5.37) (7.60) (5.41) 
Real_EM -0.116*** -73.899*** -0.108*** -66.937*** 
 (-26.57) (-14.58) (-22.61) (-13.17) 
lnTA -0.001*** 0.510** -0.001*** 0.356* 
 (-4.19) (2.37) (-4.55) (1.74) 
Ad -0.374*** -184.052*** -0.288*** -143.033*** 
 (-23.66) (-14.15) (-17.90) (-10.88) 
LEV -0.040*** -15.054*** -0.034*** -13.623*** 
 (-15.68) (-8.22) (-13.37) (-6.99) 
ROA -0.121*** -66.485*** -0.113*** -63.682*** 
 (-14.09) (-8.79) (-12.77) (-8.13) 
SaleGrowth -0.004 3.348* -0.005* 2.633 
 (-1.49) (1.68) (-1.71) (1.39) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.980*** 0.001*** 0.811*** 
 (10.02) (4.50) (8.23) (3.73) 
OpCash -0.075*** -50.685*** -0.068*** -41.275*** 
 (-7.52) (-6.01) (-6.72) (-5.03) 
Loss -0.001 0.807 -0.001 0.887 
 (-1.46) (1.07) (-1.29) (1.22) 
Big4 0.007*** 5.358*** 0.007*** 5.907*** 
 (5.36) (4.86) (5.15) (5.13) 
SGA -0.052*** -73.055*** -0.036*** -64.172*** 
 (-8.64) (-9.97) (-5.50) (-8.56) 
Cash 0.093*** 89.930*** 0.084*** 81.684*** 
 (21.31) (15.04) (18.58) (14.19) 
FinCash -0.034*** -11.724*** -0.035*** -12.179*** 
 (-8.50) (-3.21) (-9.20) (-3.59) 
CapX 0.077*** 37.007*** 0.075*** 33.548*** 
 (9.30) (5.51) (9.24) (5.17) 
PPE -0.006*** -13.286*** -0.010*** -23.454*** 
 (-3.31) (-6.05) (-5.66) (-7.69) 
Constant 0.032*** -1.799 0.020*** -0.095 
 (6.12) (-0.43) (3.70) (-0.02) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,825 28,825 28,825 28,825 
Adjusted R2 0.5926 0.4398 0.6301 0.4773 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  





CEO Power and R&D Investment 
Change Analysis  
 
 Column 1 Column 2 
 Dep. Var. = ΔRD Dep. Var. = ΔRDEmpl 
ΔCPS -0.008*** -0.608 
 (-5.24) (-0.55) 
ΔAGE 0.000 0.055 
 (1.22) (0.94) 
ΔTENURE -0.000 -0.042 
 (-0.60) (-0.10) 
ΔCOMP 0.000*** 0.081 
 (10.38) (1.60) 
ΔReal_EM -0.067*** -48.212*** 
 (-36.78) (-4.49) 
ΔlnTA -0.018*** -1.364 
 (-16.88) (-0.62) 
ΔAd -0.162*** -63.339** 
 (-13.01) (-1.98) 
ΔLEV 0.001 6.581 
 (0.50) (1.26) 
ΔROA -0.052*** -17.313*** 
 (-38.33) (-3.84) 
ΔSaleGrowth -0.001*** -1.195 
 (-2.73) (-1.38) 
ΔMTB 0.000 0.001 
 (1.64) (0.49) 
ΔOpCash -0.125*** -17.713** 
 (-50.02) (-2.36) 
ΔLoss -0.004*** 1.568* 
 (-7.87) (1.91) 
ΔBig4 -0.003 1.514 
 (-1.50) (0.79) 
ΔSGA 0.098*** 8.014 
 (29.32) (0.39) 
ΔCash -0.001 7.166 
 (-0.33) (1.22) 
ΔFinCash -0.028*** -8.554*** 
 (-17.67) (-2.84) 
ΔCapX 0.053*** 7.689 
 (9.08) (1.15) 
ΔPPE 0.006 -9.361* 
 (1.29) (-1.69) 
Constant 0.000 -1.048* 
 (0.14) (-1.71) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 25,127 25,127 
Adjusted R2 0.3295 0.0781 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  




CEO Power and R&D Investment 
2SLS Test for Endogeneity 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 Dep. Var. = CPS Dep. Var. = RD Dep. Var. = RDEmpl 
lagCPS 0.353***   
 (73.28)   
Ind_Year_Median_CPS 0.564***   
 (9.25)   
Predicted_CPS  -0.021*** -16.861*** 
  (-4.31) (-3.75) 
AGE -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.140*** 
 (-6.67) (-5.83) (-4.94) 
TENURE 0.001 0.002*** 1.357*** 
 (0.66) (4.20) (3.36) 
COMP 0.012*** 0.002*** 1.086*** 
 (75.03) (18.00) (13.62) 
Real_EM -0.004 -0.108*** -67.076*** 
 (-0.96) (-74.20) (-49.84) 
lnTA 0.015*** -0.001*** 0.395** 
 (30.14) (-4.75) (2.09) 
Ad 0.045* -0.287*** -142.651*** 
 (1.93) (-34.04) (-18.27) 
LEV 0.050*** -0.034*** -13.244*** 
 (10.84) (-19.90) (-8.40) 
ROA 0.074*** -0.112*** -63.154*** 
 (7.75) (-32.64) (-19.82) 
SaleGrowth -0.024*** -0.005*** 2.460*** 
 (-8.98) (-5.17) (2.77) 
MTB -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.797*** 
 (-10.81) (20.06) (14.25) 
OpCash 0.040*** -0.068*** -41.075*** 
 (3.89) (-18.49) (-12.11) 
Loss -0.004* -0.001 0.911 
 (-1.91) (-1.55) (1.35) 
Big4 0.001 0.007*** 5.766*** 
 (0.59) (7.46) (7.11) 
SGA -0.043*** -0.037*** -64.644*** 
 (-8.10) (-18.87) (-35.95) 
Cash -0.076*** 0.083*** 81.187*** 
 (-16.04) (47.54) (50.00) 
FinCash 0.005 -0.035*** -12.199*** 
 (0.79) (-14.76) (-5.55) 
CapX -0.137*** 0.073*** 32.024*** 
 (-7.99) (11.70) (5.56) 
PPE 0.015*** -0.010*** -23.124*** 
 (3.05) (-5.42) (-14.10) 
Constant -0.159*** 0.026*** 4.648 
 (-6.22) (5.74) (1.13) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,825 28,825 28,825 
Adjusted R2 0.3465 0.6291 0.4760 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  




CEO Power and R&D Investment 
The Role of Corporate Governance   
 Column 1 Column 2 
 Dep. Var. = RD Dep. Var. = RDEmpl 
CPS -0.019*** -19.753*** 
 (-6.08) (-5.52) 
EI 0.013* 10.932 
 (1.83) (1.41) 
CPSxEI -0.033** -31.216* 
 (-2.11) (-1.76) 
AGE -0.000*** -0.215*** 
 (-4.71) (-4.03) 
TENURE 0.002** 0.722 
 (2.42) (0.96) 
COMP 0.001*** 1.558*** 
 (11.13) (10.72) 
Real_EM -0.142*** -115.248*** 
 (-59.11) (-42.60) 
lnTA -0.002*** 1.256*** 
 (-5.59) (3.92) 
Ad -0.428*** -277.692*** 
 (-34.84) (-20.10) 
LEV -0.035*** -21.015*** 
 (-13.68) (-7.41) 
ROA -0.070*** -50.741*** 
 (-11.51) (-7.46) 
SaleGrowth -0.004** 7.775*** 
 (-2.15) (3.86) 
MTB 0.001*** 1.091*** 
 (14.38) (11.02) 
OpCash -0.053*** -48.455*** 
 (-8.31) (-6.81) 
Loss 0.004*** 7.083*** 
 (3.57) (5.22) 
Big4 0.007*** 7.846*** 
 (6.23) (5.82) 
SGA -0.076*** -107.288*** 
 (-23.31) (-29.12) 
Cash 0.077*** 99.581*** 
 (28.73) (32.90) 
FinCash -0.049*** -21.890*** 
 (-12.71) (-5.02) 
CapX 0.073*** 48.278*** 
 (7.36) (4.34) 
PPE -0.009*** -18.167*** 
 (-4.15) (-7.36) 
Constant 0.045*** 0.073 
 (8.20) (0.01) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 10,924 10,924 
Adjusted R2 0.5779 0.4317 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent (two-tailed) confidence levels, respectively.  







2 "CEOs keenly feel the tension between focusing on the disruptive future and running the current business (e.g., 
managing stakeholders, operations, sales, etc.). This may explain why 52% of CEOs said that their corporate 
priorities were weighted toward optimizing revenues from current business models..." (EY, 2017) 
 
 
